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Abstract 
The validity of discretionary fiscal policy in a recession will differ according to the cause and 
mechanism of recession. In this paper, discretionary fiscal policy in a recession caused by a 
fundamental shock that changes the steady state downwards is examined. In such a recession, 
households need to discontinuously increase consumption to a point on the saddle path to 
maintain Pareto efficiency. However, they will not “jump” consumption in this manner and 
instead will choose a “Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path” because they dislike 
unsmooth and discontinuous consumption and behave strategically. The paper concludes that 
increasing government consumption until demand meets the present level of production and 
maintaining this fiscal policy for a long period is the best option. Consequent government debts 
can be sustainable even if they become extremely large.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classification code: E20, E32, E62, H20, H30, H63 
Keywords: Discretionary Fiscal policy; Recession; Government consumption; Government 
debts; Pareto inefficiency; Time preference 
                                                       
*Correspondence: Taiji HARASHIMA, Kanazawa Seiryo University, 10-1 Goshomachi-Ushi, 
Kanazawa-shi, Ishikawa, 920-8620, Japan.  
Email: harashim@seiryo-u.ac.jp or t-harashima@mve.biglobe.ne.jp.  
 1 
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Discretionary fiscal policy has been studied from many perspectives since the era of Keynes 
(e.g., Keynes, 1936; Kopcke et al., 2006; Chari et al., 2009; Farmer, 2009; Alesina, 2012; 
Benhabib et al., 2014). An important issue is whether a government should intervene fiscally in 
a recession, and if so, how. The answer will differ according to the cause and mechanism of 
recession. Particularly, it will be different depending on whether “disequilibrium” is generated. 
The concept of disequilibrium is, however, controversial and therefore arguments continue even 
now about the use of discretionary fiscal policy in a recession. In this paper, the concept of 
disequilibrium is not used, but instead the concept of a “Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient 
path” is used.  
 Recessions are generated by various shocks (e.g., Rebelo, 2005; Blanchard, 2009; 
Ireland, 2011; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2012; McGrattan and Prescott, 2014; Hall, 2016). 
Some fundamental shocks will change the steady state, and if the steady state is changed 
downwards (i.e., to lower levels of production and consumption), households must change the 
consumption path to one that diminishes gradually to the posterior steady state. Therefore, 
growth rates become negative; that is, a recession begins. However, the explanation of the 
mechanism of this type of recession is not perfect because an important question still needs to 
be answered. If households discontinuously increase (“jump up”) their consumption from the 
prior steady state to a point on the posterior saddle path and then gradually move to the posterior 
steady state, Pareto efficiency is held and thereby unemployment rates do not rise. Therefore, 
even in a serious and large-scale recession, unemployment does not increase. This is a very 
unnatural outcome of a serious recession.  
 Harashima (2004, 2009, 2013a) showed a mechanism by which households do not 
jump up their consumption even if the steady state is changed downward because they are 
intrinsically risk averse and non-cooperative and want to smooth consumption. The 
consumption jump does not give them the highest expected utility; that is, unsmooth and 
discontinuous consumption is not optimal for households. Hence, instead of choosing the 
posterior saddle path, they will choose a “Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path” as the 
optimal consumption path. Because of its Pareto inefficiency, unemployment rates will increase 
sharply and stay high during a recession. This paper examines whether discretionary fiscal 
policy is necessary, and if it is necessary, how it should be implemented when an economy is in 
a recession and proceeding on such a Pareto inefficient path. 
 Fundamental shocks that change the steady state basically mean shocks on deep 
parameters. A representative fundamental shock, an upward shock on the rate of time preference 
(RTP), is examined in this paper. Faced with this shock, a government has three options: (1) do 
not intervene, (2) increase government consumption, and (3) cut taxes. The consequences of 
these options are examined and the outcomes are evaluated to determine which is the best 
option. I conclude that increasing government consumption until the demand meets the present 
level of production and maintaining this fiscal policy during the recession is the best option. 
Nevertheless, this option will be accompanied by large and accumulating government debts, but 
these debts can be sustained if the government properly increases taxes in the future. This option 
means that huge government debts will play an essential role as a buffer against negative effects 
of the fundamental shock. 
 
2  A MECHANISM OF RECESSION 
 
2.1  An upward RTP shock   
There are various possible sources of recession, but in this paper, a recession caused by a 
fundamental shock, particularly by an upward shift of RTP, is examined because an upward 
shift of RTP seems to be most likely the cause of the Great Recession (Harashima, 2016). A 
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technology shock was probably not the cause of the Great Recession because technology does 
not suddenly and greatly regress. Frictions on price adjustments are also unlikely to be the cause 
because the micro-foundation of friction does not seem to be sufficiently persuasive (e.g., 
Mankiw, 2001), particularly the micro-foundation of its persistence. On the other hand, 
Harashima (2016) showed that an upward RTP shock could explain the occurrence of the Great 
Recession and showed evidence that the estimated RTP of the United States increased in about 
2008.  
 RTP plays an essential role in economic activities, and its importance has been 
emphasized since the era of Irving Fisher (Fisher, 1930). One of the most important equations in 
economics is the steady state condition 
 
rθ   
 
where θ is RTP and r is the real rate of interest. This condition is a foundation of both static and 
dynamic economic studies. The mechanisms of both θ and r are equally important. Particularly, 
RTP is an essential element in expectations of economic activities because RTP is the discount 
factor for future utility. In addition, RTP has been regarded as changeable even over short 
periods (e.g., Uzawa, 1968; Epstein and Hynes, 1983; Lucas and Stokey, 1984; Parkin, 1988; 
Obstfeld, 1990; Becker and Mulligan, 1997). Furthermore, households behave based on the 
expected RTP of the representative household (RTP RH) (Harashima, 2014, 2016). That is, 
changes in RTP and the expected RTP RH can be an important source of economic fluctuations.  
 
2.2  The model  
The model in this paper is based on the models in Harashima (2004, 2009, 2013a) and assumes 
non-cooperative, identical, and infinitely long living households, and that the number of 
households is sufficiently large. Each of the households equally maximizes the expected utility 
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where yt, ct, and kt are production, consumption, and capital per capita in period t, respectively; 
A is technology and constant; u is the utility function;  tt kAfy ,  is the production 
function; and E0 is the expectations operator conditioned on the agents’ period 0 information set. 
yt, ct, and kt are monotonically continuous and differentiable in t, and u and f are monotonically 
continuous functions of ct and kt, respectively. All households initially have an identical amount 
of financial assets equal to kt, and all households gain the identical amount of income 
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. Both technology (A) and labor 
supply are assumed to be constant; that is, there is no technological progress or population 
increase. It is also assumed that there is no depreciation of capital. 
 
2.3  A Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path   
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The effects of an upward shift in RTP are shown in Figure 1. Suppose first that the economy is 
at steady state before the shock. After the upward RTP shock, the vertical line 0
dt
dct  moves 
to the left (from the solid vertical line to the dashed vertical line in Figure 1). To keep Pareto 
efficiency, consumption needs to jump immediately from the steady state before the shock (the 
prior steady state) to point Z. After the jump, consumption proceeds on the Pareto efficient 
saddle path (the posterior saddle path) from point Z to the lower steady state after the shock (the 
posterior steady state). As a result, negative economic growth rates continue for a long period, 
but unemployment rates will not increase and resources will not be destroyed or left idle. Note 
that an increase in household consumption means consuming the part capital indicated by the 
gap between the posterior saddle path (the thin dashed curve) and production (the bold solid 
curve) for each kt, which initially is the gap between point Z and W.1  
 
Figure 1: An upward RTP shock. All terms are defined in the text. 
tc  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
1 If depreciation of capital is assumed to exist, the “consumption” of excess capital will be achieved by a reduction of 
investments that correspond to depreciated capital and an increase in consumer goods and services.  
0 
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 However, this discontinuous jump to Z will be uncomfortable for risk-averse 
households that wish to smooth consumption. Households may instead chose a shortcut and, for 
example, proceed on a path on which consumption is reduced continuously from the prior 
steady state to the posterior steady state (the bold dashed line), although this shortcut is not 
Pareto efficient. The mechanism for why they are very unlikely to jump consumption is 
explained in Harashima (2004, 2009, 2013a) and also in the Appendix. Because households are 
risk averse and want to smooth consumption, and are also intrinsically non-cooperative, they 
behave strategically in game theoretic situations. Because of these features, when households 
strategically consider whether or not the jump is better for them (i.e., they are in a game 
theoretic situation), they will generally conclude that they obtain a higher expected utility if they 
do not jump. Hence, households will not actually choose this path and instead will choose a 
different transition path to the steady state (e.g., the bold dashed curve). Because this transition 
path is not on the posterior saddle path, it is not Pareto efficient (I call this transition path a 
“Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path” or more simply a “Pareto inefficient transition 
path”). Therefore, the excess resources indicated by the gap between the posterior saddle path 
(the thin dashed curve) and the Pareto inefficient transition path (the bold dashed curve) for 
each kt (initially, the gap between points Z and X) will be destroyed or left idle. Unemployment 
rates will increase sharply and stay high for a long period. 
 
3  SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT FISCALLY 
INTERVENE? 
 
3.1  The government’s options 
3.1.1  The three options 
When households choose a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path, the government 
basically has three options: (1) do not intervene, (2) increase government consumption, and 
(3) cut taxes.  
 If Option (1) is chosen, the gap between the posterior saddle path and the Pareto 
inefficient transition path (initially the gap between points Z and W) is not filled by any demand. 
Therefore, unemployment rates increase sharply and huge amounts of resources are destroyed or 
left idle. High unemployment rates and destruction of resources will continue until the economy 
reaches the posterior steady state.  
 If Option (2) is chosen, government consumption is increased to fill the demand gap 
between the posterior saddle path and the Pareto inefficient transition path, where government 
consumption is indicated on a per capita basis similar to the other variables. Suppose for 
simplicity that government consumption is zero before the shock. With increases in government 
consumption, the path of the sum of government and household consumption (hereafter 
“combined consumption”) can be equal to the posterior saddle path.  
 Conceptually, government consumption is the collective consumption of households 
through government expenditures, for example, spending on various kinds of administrative 
services that households receive. Therefore, increases in government consumption can be 
substituted for decreases in household consumption. Nevertheless, government consumption 
will not directly generate utility in households. In this sense, increases in government 
consumption may be interpreted as forced increases in household consumption. Even if 
households do not want these increases in government consumption, however, the increases will 
work to increase aggregate demand. Option (2) therefore indicates a measure to compulsorily 
fill the gap between aggregate demand and supply, even against households’ will, when the 
economy proceeds on a Pareto inefficient transition path. Notice that the excess resources 
cannot be used for investments because the economy would otherwise deviate from a path to the 
steady state.  
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 If Option (3) is chosen, households’ disposable incomes will increase, but if the 
Ricardian equivalence holds, they will still proceed on a Pareto inefficient transition path. 
Because household consumption does not change, high unemployment rates and destruction of a 
huge amount of resources continue as in Option (1). Because there is a huge amount of excess 
capital, no additional investment will be made. Nevertheless, if the Ricardian equivalence does 
not hold, tax cuts may increase household consumption at least temporarily. Therefore, the 
validity of Option (3) depends on the validity of the Ricardian equivalence. If households are 
sufficiently rational, the Ricardian equivalence will basically hold at least in the long run. 
Therefore, even if tax cuts are effective, they will be effective only in the short run, and these 
short run effects will be reversed because the Ricardian equivalence will hold in the long run.  
 
3.1.2  Financing 
In Option (3), tax cuts are financed by borrowing from households. In Option (2), an increase in 
the government consumption is financed by borrowing from or tax increases on households. 
Nevertheless, financing by borrowing will be preferred in Option (2) because the Ricardian 
equivalence may not necessarily hold in the short run. If the Ricardian equivalence does not 
hold, increases in taxes may increase unemployment rates and thereby the main aim of 
Option (2) cannot be fully achieved. Therefore, it is highly likely that an increase in government 
consumption will be financed by government borrowing, and therefore borrowing is assumed in 
this paper. However, financing by borrowing requires tax increases in the future to pay off the 
debt with interest. Options (2) and (3) assume that necessary future tax increases are fully 
implemented by the government.  
 In addition, it is assumed that a government borrows money only from its own people, 
that is, not from foreigners because foreign borrowing means that foreigners also intervene in 
addition to the government, and such intervention is beyond the scope of this paper.   
 
3.2  Comparison among options 
(1) Economic growth rate 
Because production and consumption at the posterior steady state are lower than those at the 
prior steady state, the rate of economic growth is equally negative during the transition in the 
three options except for a subordinate option of Option (2), in which, as will be shown in 
Section 4, it is zero. Nevertheless, there actually still will be steady technological progress 
(remember that no technological progress is assumed in the model), and thereby the actual rates 
of growth will not necessarily be negative or zero and may even be low but positive.  
 
(2) Household utility  
Households choose a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path equally in the three options. 
Therefore, the utilities of households are basically same in the three options.    
 
(3) Unemployment 
In Options (1) and (3), unemployment rates will rise sharply and stay high for a long period. In 
contrast, in Option (2), high unemployment rates can be avoided because the gap of demand is 
filled by increases in government consumption and thereby no resources are destroyed or left 
idle.  
 
(4) Government debt 
In Option (1), government debt does not increase because the government does not borrow 
additional money, but in Options (2) and (3), government debt will increase because of 
continuous financing by borrowing. However, if taxes are raised properly to pay off the debt in 
the future, government debt will stabilize in some future period.  
 
3.3  Government debt 
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3.3.1  Is the government debt sustainable? 
The usual arguments on sustainable government debts (e.g., Hamilton and Flavin, 1986; Bohn, 
1995) are not applicable to the government debts in Options (2) and (3) because households 
proceed on an “unusual” Pareto inefficient transition path, so an alternative approach is 
necessary. Let dt be per capita “extra” government debts in period t that are accumulated in 
Option (2) or (3). Because all dt are owned by households as assumed above, dt also indicates 
the financial assets of households, and the other household assets (other than dt) are ignored for 
simplicity. In the future, dt is redeemed with interest, but the redemption takes a long time. 
Because the Ricardian equivalence will hold in the long run, it is assumed that household 
consumption is not influenced by dt. Let zt be per capita taxes to redeem a part of dt in period t 
and also let gt be additional government borrowing in Option (2) or (3) in period t. In Option 
(2),  
 
  ttt gcy   ,                              (1) 
 
and in Option (3), 
 
  ttt gcy                                 (2) 
 
for any t because no new investment is made in Options (2) and (3) and the household assets 
other than the government bonds are ignored; yt and ct are per capita income and consumption 
of households in period t. If the condition 
 
tttt zgdr                                (3) 
 
is satisfied indefinitely in a certain future period, government debt never explodes; that is, it is 
sustainable where  10  tt rr  is the real interest rate. By equality (1) and inequality (3), the 
condition for sustainability in Option (2) is  
 
tttttt
zdrcy   .                          (4) 
 
By inequalities (2) and (3), if inequality (4) is satisfied indefinitely in a certain future period, 
government debt is also sustainable in Option (3).  
 Because the household assets other than dt are ignored, the sum of a household’s 
income and assets is  
 
  ttt cyd   . 
 
If the sum of a household’s income and assets exceeds zt, that is, if  
 
tttt cydz   ,                            (5) 
 
then zt can be imposed in the sense that households have enough resources to fully pay taxes. 
Hence, by inequalities (4) and (5), if 
 
  ttt ddr                                  (6) 
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is satisfied, taxes that satisfy the condition for sustainable debts can be imposed. Here, because 
10  tr , then inequality (6) always holds. Therefore, for any dt, there always exists zt that 
satisfies inequality (3) indefinitely in a certain future period. That is, the government debt can 
be sustainable for any dt, and even if dt becomes extremely large, the debt can be sustainable. 
Consider an extreme example. If a government collects taxes that are equivalent to dt from a 
household’s financial assets in a period, the government’s debts are eliminated completely all at 
once. That is, any dt can be sustainable. 
 Such an extreme tax will not actually be imposed, but if dt exceeds a certain amount 
such that  
 
  ttt zrdy   , 
 
(i.e., if taxes exceed income), then they need to be collected from a part of a household’s 
holdings of dt. If households well know the possibility of a tax on dt in the future, they will not 
regard their accumulated financial assets corresponding to dt as their “real” assets in the sense 
they can be freely used for consumption even though dt may be extremely large. In addition, 
because any dt can be sustainable, the tax increase can be started even after all the excess capital 
is eliminated. Hence, a huge amount of government debt can remain even if there is no excess 
capital.  
 Finally, it is important to note that the increased tax revenues should not be used to 
finance increases in government consumption for purposes other than dealing with the excess 
capital. The increased taxes should be used only to pay down dt (with interest) because the 
economy otherwise deviates from the steady state.  
 
3.3.2  How large can government debt be? 
Any dt can be sustainable but only if a government properly raises taxes and ttt zdr   is 
satisfied indefinitely in a certain future period. The question arises, however, when is “a certain 
future period”? The time at which taxes are raised is indeterminate in the discussion in the 
previous section. The tax increase can be postponed almost indefinitely if taxes will certainly be 
raised eventually. This indeterminacy may generate a political struggle because people 
intrinsically dislike tax increases, and opposition parties will utilize people’s anti-tax sentiment 
as ammunition to attack the government. Opposition parties will appeal to people that a tax 
increase is not necessary at present and that it will only generate a recession because the 
Ricardian equivalence will not hold in the short run. The government may not sufficiently refute 
this argument and persuade people that the current level of government debt is unsustainable, 
because any dt can be sustainable. The incentive for the government to raise taxes to reduce dt 
will therefore be weak.  
 Is there a problem, however, if dt becomes extremely large? As shown in Section 3.2.1, 
other things being equal, any dt can be sustainable, but if something changes and affects the 
sustainability as dt becomes larger, a large dt will not actually be sustainable. One possible 
factor that may change as dt becomes larger is uncertainty. If the tax increase has been 
postponed for a long period, questions about the ability of the government to govern the nation 
and run the economy will arise. Faced with an extremely large dt, people may begin to suspect 
that their government cannot do what it should do. Hence, uncertainty about the ability of the 
government will increase, and increased uncertainty about the government’s ability means that 
the government’s performance in the future is no longer a certainty. 
 It has been argued that good institutions, including governments, enhance economic 
growth (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 
2001, 2002; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004). Acemoglu 
et al. (2005) conclude that differences in economic institutions are empirically and theoretically 
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the fundamental cause of differences in economic development.2 It is therefore highly likely 
that a government’s ability is an important determinant of total factor productivity, that is, levels 
of production and consumption. Therefore, if uncertainty about the ability of a government 
increases, household’s expected variances of production and consumption will also increase. 
Larger variances of production and consumption mean more uncertainty about the entire future 
economy. That is, as dt increases, household uncertainty about the entire future economy 
increases.  
 An important consequence of increases in uncertainty about the entire future economy 
is an increase in household RTP. The concept of a temporally varying RTP has a long history 
(e.g., Böhm-Bawerk, 1889; Fisher, 1930; Uzawa, 1968; Lawrance, 1991; Becker and Mulligan, 
1997). In addition, uncertainty has been regarded as a key factor that changes RTP. Fisher 
(1930) argued that uncertainty, or risk, must naturally influence RTP, and higher uncertainty 
tends to raise RTP. Harashima (2004, 2009) showed a mechanism of how an increase in 
uncertainty leads to an increase in RTP by constructing an endogenous RTP model where 
uncertainty is defined by the stochastic dominance of the distribution of steady-state 
consumption. Increases in uncertainty will increase RTP RH. An increase in RTP RH indicates 
an increase in the real interest rate at steady state and consequently a decrease in production and 
consumption at the steady state because RTP RH is equal to the real interest rate at steady state 
in Ramsey-type growth models. That is, it is likely that as dt increases, long-run production and 
consumption will decrease. 
 Considering the effect of dt on RTP RH and on long run production and consumption, 
therefore, a government will not have to postpone the a tax increase for a long period and to 
accumulate an extremely large dt. Nevertheless, the scale of the effect of dt on RTP RH is 
unclear. It may be small and take a long period before households clearly recognize the negative 
effect of a large dt on RTP RH. Hence, the exact upper limit of dt is unclear, so there will still be 
much room for a government with regard to the timing and scale of tax increases.  
 When the long run negative effect of a huge dt on the expected household utility 
becomes larger than the short run effect of deviation from the Ricardian equivalence on the 
expected household utility, taxes should be raised. However, it may be difficult to judge which 
is currently larger. On the other hand, if the negative effect of the short run deviation from the 
Ricardian equivalence can be controlled such that it remains very small, it will be better to raise 
taxes even for small dt. In this sense, it may be a good idea to raise the tax rate by a very small 
percentage point amount in every period, for example, by 0.5% per year. Because this tax 
increase is very small in each period, the negative effect of any short run deviation from the 
Ricardian equivalence can be controlled such that it is also very small in each period. 
 There is another relatively minor problem associated with extremely large dt. As dt 
increases, the amount of necessary future tax increases (as shown in Section 3.3.1) will 
eventually exceed income (yt). Therefore, taxes need to be imposed not only on income but also 
on household’s financial assets corresponding to dt. However, large taxes on financial assets 
may be less easy to implement than other types of taxes both practically and politically. 
Nevertheless, an inheritance tax may be relatively easy to implement, and therefore it will be 
important as taxes on household’s financial assets.  
 
3.3.3  Price stability 
It has been argued that a large amount of government debt will result in high inflation (Sargent 
and Wallace, 1981). Fiscal theory of price level particularly emphasizes this mechanism (Leeper, 
1991; Sims, 1994, 1998; Cochrane, 2005; Woodford, 2001). However, Harashima (2006) 
showed that the relation between the government debts and inflation is not simple and presented 
a model that explains the law of motion for inflation considering government debt. The model 
in Harashima (2006) indicates that a large amount of government debts does not result in high 
                                                   
2 Some economists argue the reverse causation from growth to institutional improvement (e.g., Barro, 1999) or that 
institutional improvement has a smaller impact on growth than human capital (Glaeser et al., 2004).  
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inflation as long as the central bank is sufficiently independent. Inflation will not be affected by 
temporary increases in government expenditure and consequent future taxes. As a result, if the 
central bank is sufficiently independent, the government can implement Option (2) without 
worrying about an outbreak of high inflation. 
 
3.4  Evaluation 
As shown in Section 3.2, the rate of economic growth in the three options is equally negative 
until arriving at the steady state, and household utilities are basically same in the three options. 
On the other hand, unemployment rates will rise sharply and stay high for a long period in 
Options (1) and (3), but not in Option (2). As argued in Section 3.3, the extra government debts 
are sustainable if the government properly increases taxes in the future. If the future tax increase 
is properly implemented, therefore, Option (2) is favorable to Options (1) and (3) because 
unemployment rates do not rise.  
 
4  HOW SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT 
INCREASE ITS CONSUMPTION? 
 
4.1  Subordinate options in Option (2) 
Option (2) is the best choice, but how should the government increase its consumption? There 
are two basic subordinate options in Option (2).  
 
Option (2-1): Increase government consumption in order for the combined consumption to 
jump up to point Z and then proceed on the posterior saddle path to the posterior steady state. 
Option (2-2): Increase government consumption for the combined consumption to jump up to 
point W, and then stay at point W. 
 
Remember that combined consumption indicates the sum of government and household 
consumptions. Option (2-1) indicates that the government intervenes so as to make the 
combined consumption proceed on the posterior saddle path and eventually reach the posterior 
steady state, and Option (2-2) indicates that it intervenes so as to make the production and 
combined consumption stay at the prior steady state (i.e., at point W) forever. Note that, as noted 
in Section 3.1.1, excess resources cannot be used for investments because the economy would 
otherwise deviate from the posterior saddle path in Option (2-1) and from point W in 
Option (2-2). 
 
4.2  Option (2-1) 
4.2.1  Basic features 
When a government chooses Option (2-1), each household may change its consumption path in 
response to the government’s action, but it is highly likely that households will still proceed on a 
Pareto inefficient transition path because the households’ expected utilities are not affected by 
the increase in government consumption. Here, a gap between the posterior saddle path (the thin 
dashed curve in Figure 1) and production (the bold solid curve) for each kt indicates excess 
capital. Excess capital needs to be “consumed” for the economy to be on the posterior saddle 
path.3 Option (2-1) means that excess capital is consumed by the government. In addition, to be 
on the posterior saddle path, government consumption needs to be increased not only to 
consume excess capital but also to substitute for a reduction in household consumption that is 
the source of the excess capital. That is, the government needs to consume not only the gap 
between the posterior saddle path and production (i.e., excess capital), but also the gap between 
                                                   
3 If capital depreciation is assumed to exist, consumption of excess capital will be achieved by a reduction of 
investments that corresponds to depreciated capital inputs and an increase in consumer goods and services.  
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production and the Pareto inefficient transition path while the economy proceeds from the prior 
steady state to the posterior steady state. Because of the increase in government consumption, 
the economy proceeds on the posterior saddle path and thereby high and persistent 
unemployment rates are avoided.  
 
4.2.2  Subordinate options 
However, how does a government “consume” such a large quantity of excess resources, most of 
which were originally produced as capital? There are three basic subordinate options: Options 
(2-1-a), (2-1-b), and (2-1-c). 
 The easiest way for a government to consume the excess resources is simply to buy 
them from firms and dispose of them (Option (2-1-a)). “Dispose of” in this case includes not 
only eliminating them but also leaving them unused forever or constructing useless 
infrastructure. It will also mean giving laborers busy work, including the classic example of 
“having workers dig holes and then fill them back up.” These activities do not generate any 
utility for households, but they can be interpreted as a kind of “consumption” in the broad sense 
that the products purchased are intentionally made unusable. High unemployment rates can be 
avoided, but huge amounts of resources are systematically and continuously disposed of and 
negative growth rates continue for a long period.  
 Disposing of the excess resources in Option (2-2-a) is different from destroying them 
in Option (1) because the owners of the excess resources lose them without compensation in 
Option (1), but sell them to the government in Option (2-1-a). The excess resources are equally 
eliminated in both options, but nothing remains in the hands of the former owners or the 
government in Option (1), whereas financial assets and debts remain in the hands of the former 
owners and government, respectively, in Option (2-1-a). 
 Another way to consume the excess resources is to export them to other countries at 
lower prices than the prevailing international prices (Option (2-1-b). This is not “consumption” 
in the literal sense, but it can be interpreted as a sort of consumption in that exports are an 
element of demand. The government does not necessarily need to directly export the excess 
resources. Instead, it can indirectly support exports by directly subsidizing firms or through 
various kinds of regulations. An important problem with this option is that other countries may 
not accept the excessive exports. This option clearly means setting prices that are far lower than 
the costs of production (i.e., dumping) on a large scale. Other countries would not be likely to 
stay silent on this issue and would likely take countermeasures, for example, by imposing high 
anti-dumping customs. Therefore, Option (2-1-b) will generally not be adopted in a democratic 
country.   
 There is one more important subordinate option. With minor modifications, capital 
inputs can be used to produce arms and munitions. Hence, the necessary increase in government 
consumption can easily be achieved by a large military buildup (Option (2-1-c)). An important 
problem with this option is that a unilateral excessive military buildup will greatly worsen 
international relations and increase political and military tensions among countries. Therefore, 
in a democratic country, Option (2-1-c) will generally not be adopted. 
 
4.3  Option (2-2) 
4.3.1  Basic features 
For the same reason as given for Option (2-1), it is highly likely that households also proceed on 
a Pareto inefficient transition path in Option (2-2). When households proceed on this path, if the 
government does nothing, a part of the capital that is used to produce products corresponding to 
households’ reduction in consumption becomes excess capital and will be destroyed, but if the 
government purchases and consumes these unconsumed products, the capital need not be 
destroyed and the level of capital will remain the same in the next period. If the government 
purchases and consumes the unconsumed products in every period, capital will continue to stay 
at the same level indicated by point W. The phenomenon where capital is prevented from being 
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reduced by government intervention may be interpreted as keeping so-called “zombie” firms 
alive. As in Option (2-1), high unemployment rates can be avoided, but unlike in Option (2-1), 
the growth rate is not negative. Rather, it is zero because the economy stays at point W forever. 
 An important difference between Options (2-1) and (2-2) is that, unlike Option (2-1), 
capital is not consumed by the government in Option (2-2), but households’ reduction in 
consumption is equally substituted by an increase in government consumption in both options. 
That is, in Option (2-2), the government consumes only the gap between production at point W 
and the Pareto inefficient transition path (bold dashed curve) and does not consume the gap 
between the posterior saddle path (thin dashed curve) and production at point W (i.e., capital). 
As a result, production and capital remain at point W forever in Option (2-2).  
 
4.3.2  Subordinate options 
Option (2-2) also consists of three basic subordinate options depending on what path is chosen 
at point W: Options (2-2-a), (2-2-b), and (2-2-c). As was the case with Option (2-1-a), the 
easiest way for a government to consume excess resources is simply to buy them from firms and 
dispose of them (Option (2-2-a)). As with Options (2-1-b) and (2-1-c), the necessary jump of the 
government consumption can be achieved by exporting the excess resources (Option (2-2-b)) or 
by a military buildup (Option (2-2-c)). However, for the same reasons as given for Options 
(2-1-b) and (2-1-c), Options (2-2-b) and (2-2-c) will generally not be adopted in a democratic 
country.  
 
4.4  Comparison and evaluation 
Section 4.3 indicates that the only feasible options are (2-1-a) and (2-2-a). On major issues, 
commonalities and differences between the two options are as follows. 
 
(1) Period of government intervention 
In Option (2-1-a), excess capital decreases gradually and eventually becomes zero when the 
economy arrives at the posterior steady state.4 Hence, the period of transition and government 
intervention is definite. In Option (2-2-a), however, the economy never approaches the posterior 
steady state. Hence, the government intervention never ends.  
 
(2) Scale of government intervention 
Because government consumption needs to be initially increased to point Z in Option (2-1-a), 
the scale of intervention is initially much larger in Option (2-1-a) than in Option (2-2-a). 
However, in Option (2-1-a), excess capital gradually decreases and eventually reaches the level 
of the posterior steady state, and thereby the necessary increase in government consumption 
decreases to zero as the economy approaches the posterior steady state. On the other hand, in 
Option (2-2-a), the necessary increase in government consumption increases as household 
consumption gradually decreases to the level at the posterior steady state. In sum, the scale of 
intervention is initially larger in Option (2-1-a) than it is Option (2-2-a), but this relation will be 
reversed in some future period.  
 
(3) Growth rates during the transition 
In Option (2-1-a), the growth rates are negative, whereas in Option (2-2-a), they are zero.  
 
(4) Household utility  
In both options, household consumption proceeds on the same Pareto inefficient transition path. 
In addition, the Ricardian equivalence holds in the long run. Therefore, the utilities that 
                                                   
4 More correctly, the economy never arrives exactly at the posterior steady state, but it arrives close to it in a definite 
period.  
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households will obtain from the stream of consumption after the shock are almost the same in 
both cases.  
 
(5) Unemployment 
In both options, unemployment rates do not increase.  
 
(6) Government debt  
In both options, a large amount of government debt accumulates. However, if the government 
properly increases taxes in the future, the debt will stabilize at some level in both options.   
 
Although the period and scale of government interventions differ between the two options, these 
differences basically do not matter to household optimality. Therefore, because the only 
difference in the evaluated criteria is that growth rates are higher in Option (2-2-a), Option 
(2-2-a) is considered to be more favorable than Option (2-1-a). 
 
4.5  Technological progress 
Although Option (2-2-a) is the best, it has its drawbacks. Huge amounts of resources need to be 
disposed of in the name of the government consumption forever. Although this is rational from 
an economic point of view, it may not be environmentally or ethically reasonable. If there is a 
way to reduce the amount of discarded resources, that is, reduce excess capital, Option (2-2-a) 
could be much better. It is impossible to find that way within the framework discussed in the 
previous sections, but if the assumption on technological progress is loosened, it may be 
possible.  
 Thus far, I have assumed no technological progress, but in reality, technologies 
steadily progress. In addition, technological progress basically requires additional increases in 
capital. Instead of adding capital, however, the new capital that is embedded in new 
technologies can be introduced by using part of the excess capital. As a result, the amount of 
excess capital is gradually reduced as part of the process of technological progress. Of course, 
not all of the excess capital can be easily replaced in each period, but most of it should be able 
to be replaced in the long run.  
 With the gradual replacement of the excess capital through technological progress, the 
excess capital will eventually be fully eliminated and the government intervention will end. 
Note nevertheless that this elimination process will take a long time. In addition, the economic 
growth caused by technological progress will be slower because part of the increase in capital 
required by technological progress is being replaced with a reduction in excess capital. The 
economy will therefore grow more slowly because of the relatively slower growth of capital.   
 
5  DISCUSSION 
 
5.1  Japan since the 1990s 
Japan has experienced low, occasionally negative, growth rates since the 1990s, even though the 
Japanese government has spent huge amounts of money to stabilize its economy by issuing 
similarly huge amounts of government bonds. At the same time, the debts of the Japanese 
government have greatly increased. Japan’s experience seems to be very similar to the 
consequences predicted when Option (2-2-a) is chosen. This similarity implies that the 
stagnation of the Japanese economy since the 1990s was caused by an upward RTP shock, and 
the Japanese government chose Option (2-2-a) as the countermeasure to the shock. Harashima 
(2016) examines this possibility theoretically and empirically and concludes that RTP RH of 
Japan rose 2–3 percentage points in the early 1990s, and this upward shift of RTP RH was the 
cause of the stagnation of Japanese economy since the 1990s.  
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 If the Japanese government had not chosen Option (2-2-a) and had instead chosen 
Option (1), Japan would have experienced a significantly more severe recession, possibly 
similar to the Great Depression of the 1930s. Production would have decreased and 
unemployment rates would have increased far more than they did actually. Therefore, the 
Japanese government may be praised for choosing the best option when facing a large upward 
shift of RTP RH. However, the Japanese government should keep in mind that Option (2-2-a) is 
only the best option if the government properly increases taxes to redeem the debts at some 
point in the future.  
  
5.2  The Great Depression and World War II 
Many hypotheses on the causes of the Great Depression in the 1930s have been presented, but 
no consensus has been reached. The phenomena observed during the Great Depression are very 
similar to those predicted when Option (1) is chosen; that is, the growth rates were negative and 
unemployment rates rose sharply. In addition, this agonizing situation was prolonged. Here, I 
have indicated that the best option to tackle such a situation is to adopt Option (2-2-a), but large 
discretionary fiscal interventions by governments were generally seen as taboo in that period. 
Government expenditures were increased only to a limited extent in the United States with the 
introduction of the New Deal, and the Great Depression persisted. 
 However, the U.S. economy recovered in 1940s after government consumption was 
greatly increased to build up the military in the face of the outbreak of World War II. It is likely 
that the U.S. government unintentionally or compulsorily chose Option (2-1-c) or (2-2-c). 
Unemployment rates declined and destroying or disposing of resources stopped as predicted by 
both options. In this case, it appears that the taboo against discretionary fiscal intervention was 
broken because of the threat and outbreak of a large-scale war.  
 Similar phenomena were observed in Germany. Germany was one of the hardest-hit 
economies by the Great Depression, but after the Nazis took power in 1933, the German 
economy recovered quickly and sharply. The government of Nazi Germany significantly 
intervened in various aspects of the German economy. This intervention eliminated the 
large-scale Pareto inefficiency that was generated by the Great Depression. In particular, the 
German government greatly built up its military so it is likely that Option (2-1-c) or (2-2-c) was 
adopted to restore the German economy.  
 
6  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
If the steady state is shifted downwards by a fundamental shock, each household must change 
its consumption path to one that diminishes gradually to the posterior steady state. Because 
consumption decreases, a recession begins. In this case, if households increase their 
consumption discontinuously to a point on the posterior saddle path and then follow that to the 
posterior steady state, Pareto efficiency is held and unemployment rates do not rise. However, 
households will not behave like this because it does not give them the highest expected utility. 
Households are risk averse and dislike unsmooth and discontinuous consumption. Instead, 
households will choose a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path as the optimal 
consumption path. Because of its Pareto inefficiency, the unemployment rate will increase 
sharply and stay high for a long period.   
 In this paper, I examined whether discretionary fiscal policy is necessary if this type of 
recession occurs, and if it is necessary, how it should be implemented. Particularly, the fiscal 
policy for a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path caused by an upward shock on RTP 
was examined. In this case, a government has three options: (1) do not intervene, (2) increase 
government consumption, and (3) cut taxes. Option (2) has several subordinate options. I 
compared and evaluated these options and concluded that increasing government consumption 
until the demand meets the present level of production and maintaining this fiscal policy is the 
best option. The accompanying huge government debts can be sustainable even though they are 
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extremely large if the government properly increases taxes in the future. In this option, large 
government debts play an essential role as a buffer against the negative effects of the shock. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path 
 
A1  Model with non-cooperative households 5 
A1.1  The shock 
The model describes the utility maximization of households after an upward time preference  
shock. This shock was chosen because it is one of the few shocks that result in a Nash 
equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. Another important reason for selecting an upward time 
preference shock is that it shifts the steady state to lower levels of production and consumption 
than before the shock, which is consistent with the phenomena actually observed in a recession.  
  Although the rate of time preference (RTP) is a deep parameter, it has not been 
regarded as a source of shocks for economic fluctuations, possibly because RTP is thought to be 
constant and not to shift suddenly. There is also a practical reason, however. Models with a 
permanently constant RTP exhibit excellent tractability (see Samuelson, 1937). However, RTP 
has been naturally assumed and actually observed to be time-variable. The concept of a 
time-varying RTP has a long history (e.g., Böhm-Bawerk, 1889; Fisher, 1930). More recently, 
Lawrance (1991) and Becker and Mulligan (1997) showed that people do not inherit 
permanently constant RTPs by nature and that economic and social factors affect the formation 
of RTPs. Their arguments indicate that many incidents can affect and change RTP throughout a 
person’s life. For example, Parkin (1988) examined business cycles in the United States, 
explicitly considering the time-variability of RTP, and showed that RTP was as volatile as 
technology and leisure preference.  
 
A1.2  Households 
Households are not intrinsically cooperative. Except in a strict communist economy, households 
do not coordinate themselves to behave as a single entity when consuming goods and services. 
The model in this paper assumes non-cooperative, identical, and infinitely long living 
households and that the number of households is sufficiently large. Each of them equally 
maximizes the expected utility 
 
     dtcuθtE t


0
0 exp  , 
 
subject to 
 
    ttt
t cδkkA,f
dt
dk
  , 
 
where yt, ct, and kt are production, consumption, and capital per capita in period t, respectively; 
A is technology and constant; u is the utility function;  tt kAfy , is the production function; 
  >θ 0 is RTP; δ is the rate of depreciation; and E0 is the expectations operator conditioned on 
the agents’ period 0 information set. yt, ct, and kt are monotonically continuous and 
differentiable in t, and u and f are monotonically continuous functions of ct and kt, respectively. 
All households initially have an identical amount of financial assets equal to kt, and all 
households gain the identical amount of income  tt kAfy ,  in each period. It is assumed 
                                                   
5 The model in Appendix is based on the model by Harashima (2012). See also Harashima (2004, 2013b). 
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technology (A) and labor supply are assumed to be constant. 
 The effects of an upward shift in RTP are shown in Figure A1. Suppose first that the 
economy is at steady state before the shock. After the upward RTP shock, the vertical line 
0
dt
dct  moves to the left (from the solid vertical line to the dashed vertical line in Fig. 1). To 
keep Pareto efficiency, consumption needs to jump immediately from the steady state before the 
shock (the prior steady state) to point Z. After the jump, consumption proceeds on the Pareto 
efficient saddle path after the shock (the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path) from point Z to 
the lower steady state after the shock (the posterior steady state). Nevertheless, this 
discontinuous jump to Z may be uncomfortable for risk-averse households that wish to smooth 
consumption and not to experience substantial fluctuations. Households may instead take a 
shortcut and, for example, proceed on a path on which consumption is reduced continuously 
from the prior steady state to the posterior steady state (the bold dashed line in Fig. 1), but this 
shortcut is not Pareto efficient. 
  Choosing a Pareto inefficient consumption path must be consistent with each 
household’s maximization of its expected utility. To examine the possibility of the rational 
choice of a Pareto inefficient path, the expected utilities between the two options need be 
compared. For this comparison, I assume that there are two options for each non-cooperative 
household with regard to consumption just after an upward shift in RTP. The first is a jump 
option, J, in which a household’s consumption jumps to Z and then proceeds on the posterior 
Pareto efficient saddle path to the posterior steady state. The second is a non-jump option, NJ, in 
which a household’s consumption does not jump but instead gradually decreases from the prior 
steady state to the posterior steady state, as shown by the bold dashed line in Figure A1. The 
household that chooses the NJ option reaches the posterior steady state in period  0s . The 
difference in consumption between the two options in each period t is bt (≥ 0). Thus, b0 indicates 
the difference between Z and the prior steady state. bt diminishes continuously and becomes 
zero in period s. The NJ path of consumption (ct) after the shock is monotonically continuous 
and differentiable in t and 0
dt
dct  if st 0 . In addition,  
 
tt ccc ˆ    if st 0  
                             cct        if ts 0  ,  
 
where tcˆ  is consumption when proceeding on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path and c  
is consumption in the posterior steady state. Therefore, 
 
0ˆ  ttt ccb    if st 0  
                          0tb             if ts 0  . 
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  It is also assumed that, when a household chooses a different option from the one the 
other households choose, the difference in the accumulation of financial assets resulting from 
the difference in consumption (bt) before period s between that household and the other 
households is reflected in consumption after period s. That is, the difference in the return on 
financial assets is added to (or subtracted from) the household’s consumption in each period 
after period s. The exact functional form of the addition (or subtraction) is shown in Section 
A1.4. 
 
A1.3  Firms 
Unutilized products because of bt are eliminated quickly in each period by firms because 
holding them for a long period is a cost to firms. Elimination of unutilized products is 
accomplished by discarding the goods or preemptively suspending production, thereby leaving 
some capital and labor inputs idle. However, in the next period, unutilized products are 
generated again because the economy is not proceeding on the Pareto efficient saddle path. 
Unutilized products are therefore successively generated and eliminated. Faced with these 
unutilized products, firms dispose of the excess capital used to generate the unutilized products. 
Disposing of the excess capital is rational for firms because the excess capital is an unnecessary 
cost, but this means that parts of the firms are liquidated, which takes time and thus disposing of 
the excess capital will also take time. If the economy proceeds on the NJ path (that is, if all 
households choose the NJ option), firms dispose of all of the remaining excess capital that 
generates bt and adjust their capital to the posterior steady-state level in period s, which also 
corresponds to households reaching the posterior steady state. Thus, if the economy proceeds on 
the NJ path, capital kt is 
 
tt kkk
ˆ    if st 0  
                            kkt        if ts 0  , 
 
where tkˆ  is capital per capita when proceeding on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path 
and k  is capital per capita in the posterior steady state. 
  The real interest rate it is  
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Because the real interest rate equals RTP at steady state, if the economy proceeds on the NJ 
path, 
 
θiθ t 
~
  if st 0  
                             θit       if ts 0  ,  
 
where θ
~
 is RTP before the shock and θ  is RTP after the shock. 
ti  is monotonically 
continuous and differentiable in t if st 0 . 
 
A1.4  Expected utility after the shock 
The expected utility of a household after the shock depends on its choice of the J or NJ path. Let 
Jalone indicate that the household chooses option J, but the other households choose option NJ; 
NJalone indicate that the household chooses option NJ, but the other households choose option 
J; Jtogether indicate that all households choose option J; and NJtogether indicate that all 
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households choose option NJ. Let p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1) be the subjective probability of a household that 
the other households choose the J option (e.g., p = 0 indicates that all the other households 
choose option NJ). With p, the expected utility of a household when it chooses option J is  
 
       JaloneEpJtogetherpEJE 000 1  ,               (A1) 
 
and when it chooses option NJ is 
 
     00 pENJE  (NJalone)+    NJtogetherEp 01  ,             (A2) 
 
where  JaloneE0 ,  NJaloneE0 ,  JtogetherE0 , and  NJtogetherE0  are the expected 
utilities of the household when choosing Jalone, NJalone, Jtogether, and NJtogether, 
respectively. Given the properties of J and NJ shown in Sections A1.2 and A1.3, 
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and the shock occurred in period t = 0. Figure A2 shows the paths of Jalone and NJalone. 
Because there is a sufficiently large number of households and the effect of an individual 
household on the whole economy is negligible, in the case of Jalone, the economy almost 
proceeds on the NJ path. Similarly, in the case of NJalone, it almost proceeds on the J path. If 
the other households choose the NJ option (Jalone or NJtogether), consumption after s is 
constant as c and capital is adjusted to k by firms in period s. In addition, at and it are constant 
after s such that at equals a and is equals θ, because the economy is at the posterior steady state. 
Nevertheless, during the transition period before s, the value of it changes from the value of the 
prior RTP to that of the posterior RTP. If the other households choose option J (NJalone or 
Jtogether), however, consumption after s is
tcˆ and capital is not adjusted to k by firms in period s 
and remains at tkˆ . 
  As mentioned in Section A1.2, the difference in the returns on financial assets for the 
household from the returns for each of the other households is added to (or subtracted from) its 
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consumption in each period after period s. This is described by at and a in equations (A3) and 
(A4), and equations (A5) and (A6) indicate that the accumulated difference in financial assets 
resulting from bt increases by compound interest between the period r to s. That is, if the 
household takes the NJalone path, it accumulates more financial assets than each of the other J 
households, and instead of immediately consuming these extra accumulated financial assets 
after period s, the household consumes the returns on them in every subsequent period. If the 
household takes the Jalone path, however, its consumption after s is ac  , as shown in 
equation (A3). a  is subtracted because the income of each household,  tt kAfy , , including 
the Jalone household, decreases equally by bt. Each of the other NJ households decreases 
consumption by bt at the same time, which compensates for the decrease in income; thus, its 
financial assets (i.e., capital per capita; kt) are kept equal to tkˆ . The Jalone household, however, 
does not decrease its consumption, and its financial assets become smaller than those of each of 
the other NJ households, which results in the subtraction of a  after period s. 
 
A2  Nash Equilibrium of Pareto Inefficiency Path 6 
A2.1  Rational Pareto inefficient path  
A2.1.1  Rational choice of a Pareto inefficient path 
Before examining the economy with non-cooperative households, I first show that, if 
households are cooperative, only option J is chosen as the path after the shock because it gives a 
higher expected utility than option NJ. Because there is no possibility of Jalone and NJalone if 
households are cooperative, then    JtogetherEJE 00  and    NJtogetherENJE 00  . 
Therefore,  
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ttt bcc   and tcc ˆ . 
  Next, I examine the economy with non-cooperative households. First, the special case 
with a utility function with a sufficiently small γ is examined.  
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Proof:     NJtogetherEJaloneE
γ
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6 The idea of a rationally chosen Pareto inefficient path was originally presented by Harashima (2004). 
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because, if  st 0 , then θit   and    
s
t
q dqitsθ expexp . Hence, because   tsθ exp  

s
t
q dqiexp ,     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  for sufficiently small γ.               ■ 
 
  Second, the opposite special case (i.e., a utility function with a sufficiently large γ) is 
examined.  
 
Lemma A2: If   γγ 0  is sufficiently large and if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, then  JaloneE0  
  00 NJtogetherE . 
Proof: Because 
tb0 , then  
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Thus,  
 
                     
γ
l i m
γc
γ


1
1
 [E0 (Jalone) – E0 (NJtogether)] 
      dtcubcuθt
c
γ
ttt
γ
s
γγ



  limexp
1
lim
01
 
                         dtcuacuθt
c
γ
γsγγ





  limexp
1
lim
1
 
                   00   . 
 
Because 0
1
1


γc
γ
 for any   γγ 1 , then if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
,    NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   
< 0 for sufficiently large  γ .                                               ■ 
 
The condition 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
indicates that path NJ from c0 to c deviates sufficiently from the 
posterior Pareto efficient saddle path and reaches the posterior steady state c not taking much 
time. Because steady states are irrelevant to the degree of risk aversion (γ), both c0 and c  are 
irrelevant to γ.  
 By Lemmas A1 and A2, it can be proved that     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  is 
possible. 
 
Lemma A3: If 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, then there is a    γγ 0  such that if  γγ , 
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    000  NJtogetherEJaloneE . 
Proof: If  0γ  is sufficiently small, then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  by Lemma A1, 
and if  γ  is sufficiently large and if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, then    NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   
0  by Lemma A2. Hence, if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, there is a certain    γγ 0  such that, if 
 γγ , then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE .                                ■ 
 
  However,     000  NJaloneEJtogetherE  because both Jtogether and NJalone 
indicate that all the other households choose option J; thus, the values of it and kt are the same as 
those when all households proceed on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path. Faced with 
these it and kt, deviating alone from the Pareto efficient path (NJalone) gives a lower expected 
utility than Jtogether to the NJ household. Both Jalone and NJtogether indicate that all the other 
households choose option NJ and it and kt are not those of the Pareto efficient path. Hence, the 
sign of    NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   varies depending on the conditions, as Lemma A3 
indicates.  
  By Lemma A3 and the property     000  NJaloneEJtogetherE , the possibility of 
the choice of a Pareto inefficient transition path, that is,     000  NJEJE , is shown. 
 
Proposition A1: If 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
 and  γγ , then there is a  10   pp  such that if 
*pp  ,     000  NJEJE , and if 
*pp  ,     000  NJEJE . 
Proof: By Lemma A3, if  γγ , then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  and 
 JtogetherE0    00  NJaloneE . By equations (A1) and (A2),  
 
      NJEJE 00 p     NJaloneEJtogetherE 00  + (1 - p)     NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   . 
 
Thus, if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
and  γγ ,     NJEJE
p
00
0
lim 

    000  NJtogetherEJaloneE and 
         0lim 0000
1


NJaloneEJtogetherENJEJE
p
. Hence, by the intermediate value 
theorem, there is  10   pp  such that if *pp  ,     000  NJEJE  and if *pp  , 
    000  NJEJE .                                                             ■ 
 
Proposition A1 indicates that, if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
,  γγ , and p < p*, then the choice of 
option NJ gives the higher expected utility than that of option J to a household; that is, a 
household may make the rational choice of taking a Pareto inefficient transition path. The 
lemmas and proposition require no friction, so a Pareto inefficient transition path can be chosen 
even in a frictionless economy. This result is very important because it offers counter-evidence 
against the conjecture that households never rationally choose a Pareto inefficient transition path 
in a frictionless economy. 
 
A2.1.2  Conditions for a rational Pareto inefficient path 
The proposition requires several conditions. Among them,  γγ  may appear rather strict. 
If γ* is very large, path NJ will rarely be chosen. However, if path NJ is such that consumption 
is reduced sharply after the shock, the NJ option yields a higher expected utility than the J 
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option even though γ is very small. For example, for any   γγ 0 , 
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As γ increases, the ratio 
   
   bθscucu
cubcu ss


 decreases; thus, larger values of s can satisfy 
    000  NJtogetherEJaloneE . For example, suppose that c = 10, cs = 10.2, b = 0.3, and θ 
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= 0.05. If 1γ , then s* = 1.5 at the minimum, and if 5γ , then s* = 6.8 at the minimum. This 
result implies that, if option NJ is such that consumption is reduced relatively sharply after the 
shock (e.g., bbt  ) and 
*pp  , option NJ will usually be chosen. Choosing option NJ is not a 
special case observed only if γ is very large, but option NJ can normally be chosen when the 
value of γ is within usually observed values. Conditions for generating a rational Pareto 
inefficient transition path therefore are not strict. In a recession, consumption usually declines 
sharply after the shock, which suggests that households have chosen the NJ option. 
 
A3  Nash equilibrium 
A3.1  A Nash equilibrium consisting of NJ strategies  
A household strategically determines whether to choose the J or NJ option, considering other 
households’ choices. All households know that each of them forms expectations about the 
future values of its utility and makes a decision in the same manner. Since all households are 
identical, the best response of each household is identical. Suppose that there are  NΗ   
identical households in the economy where H is sufficiently large (as assumed in Section A1). 
Let  10  ηη qq  be the probability that a household  Ηη   chooses option J. The average 
utility of the other households almost equals that of all households because H is sufficiently 
large. Hence, the average expected utilities of the other households that choose the J and NJ 
options are E0(Jtogether) and E0(NJtogether), respectively. Hence, the payoff matrix of the 
Η-dimensional symmetric mixed strategy game can be described as shown in Table A1. Each 
identical household determines its behavior on the basis of this payoff matrix.  
 In this mixed strategy game, the strategy profiles  
 
(q1,q2,…,qH) = {(1,1,…,1), (
*** ,...,, ppp ), (0,0,…,0)} 
 
are Nash equilibria for the following reason. By Proposition A1, the best response of household 
η is J (i.e., qη = 1) if 
*pp  , indifferent between J and NJ (i.e., any  10,qη  ) if 
*pp  , and NJ 
(i.e., qη = 0) if 
*pp  . Because all households are identical, the best-response correspondence 
of each household is identical such that qη = 1 if 
*pp  , [0,1] if *pp  , and 0 if *pp   for 
any household Ηη . Hence, the mixed strategy profiles (1, 1,…,1), ( *** ,...,, ppp ), and 
(0,0,…,0) are the intersections of the graph of the best-response correspondences of all 
households. The Pareto efficient saddle path solution (1,1,…,1) (i.e., Jtogether) is a pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium, but a Pareto inefficient transition path (0,0,…,0) ( i.e., NJtogether) is 
also a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
( *** ,...,, ppp ).  
 
A3.2  Selection of equilibrium 
Determining which Nash equilibrium, either NJtogether (0,0,…,0) or Jtogether (1,1,…,1), is 
dominant requires refinements of the Nash equilibrium, which necessitate additional criteria. 
Here, if households have a risk-averse preference in the sense that they avert the worst scenario 
when its probability is not known, households suppose a very low p and select the NJtogether 
(0,0,…,0) equilibrium. Because 
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          = E0 (Jalone) – E0 (NJtogether) < 0 ,                                  (A7) 
 
by Lemma A3, Jalone is the worst choice in terms of the amount of payoff, followed by 
NJtogether, and NJalone, and Jtogether is the best. The outcomes of choosing option J are more 
dispersed than those of option NJ. If households have a risk-averse preference in the 
above-mentioned sense and avert the worst scenario when they have no information on its 
probability, a household will prefer the less dispersed option (NJ), fearing the worst situation 
that the household alone substantially increases consumption while the other households 
substantially decrease consumption after the shock. This behavior is rational because it is 
consistent with preferences. Because all households are identical and know inequality (A7), all 
households will equally suppose that they all prefer the less dispersed NJ option; therefore, all 
of them will suppose a very low p, particularly 0p , and select the NJtogether (0,0,…,0) 
equilibrium, which is the Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. Thereby, unlike most 
multiple equilibria models, the problem of indeterminacy does not arise, and “animal spirits” 
(e.g., pessimism or optimism) are unnecessary to explain the selection. 
 
A4  Amplified generation of unutilized resources 
A Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path successively generates unutilized products 
because of bt. They are left unused, discarded, or preemptively not produced during the path. 
Unused or discarded goods and services indicate a decline in sales and an increase in inventory 
for firms. Preemptively suspended production results in an increase in unemployment and idle 
capital. As a result, profits decline and some parts of firms need to be liquidated, which is 
unnecessary if the economy proceeds on the J path (i.e., the posterior Pareto efficient path). If 
the liquidation is implemented immediately after the shock, unutilized products because of bt 
will no longer be generated, but such a liquidation would generate a tremendous shock. The 
process of the liquidation, however, will take time because of various frictions, and excess 
capital that generates unutilized products because of bt will remain for a long period. During the 
period when capital is not reduced to the posterior steady-state level, unutilized products are 
successively generated. In a period, unutilized products are generated and eliminated, but in the 
next period, another, new, unutilized products are generated and eliminated. This cycle is 
repeated in every period throughout the transition path, and it implies that demand is lower than 
supply in every period. This phenomenon may be interpreted as a general glut or a persisting 
disequilibrium by some definitions of equilibrium. 
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Figure A2: The paths of Jalone and NJalone 
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Figure A3: A Pareto inefficient transition path 
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Table A1  The payoff matrix 
 
              Any other household 
  J  NJ  
H
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se
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ld
 A
       
J  E0(Jtogether), E0(Jtogether) E0(Jalone), E0(NJtogether) 
      
NJ  E0(NJalone), E0(Jtogether) E0(NJtogether), E0(NJtogether) 
 
 
 
